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ABSTRACT
The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) along with the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) and Idaho State University’s Idaho Accelerator Center (IAC) 
has designed and tested a nominal 10-MeV prototype Pulsed Photonuclear 
Assessment (PPA) inspection system to detect shielded nuclear material. This 
report highlights two specific areas that will provide further PPA technology 
enhancements, namely, an optimal gamma-ray detection system and the off-axis 
radiation detection sensitivity.
Detection of low-atomic number (Z) shielded nuclear material had been 
initially addressed by the inclusion of dedicated Geiger-Müller (GM) detectors 
co-located above each of the Photonuclear Neutron Detectors (PNDs). Several 
different radiation detectors were investigated to assess if this type of gamma-
ray detector was optimal. The LND 719 GM detector was shown to have the 
best photon sensitivity and demonstrated an optimal ability to detect low-Z 
shielded nuclear material. Beyond the technical performance of this detector, its 
low cost and availability makes it a logical choice for a field-deployable system.  
In terms of off-axis detection sensitivity, simulation and benchmarking 
experiments have indicated that the PPA inspection system can successfully 
detect nuclear material (within 120 seconds) in various shielding configurations 
even when it is located at a distance of as much as 30 cm off the interrogating 
beam axis (the exact sensitivity to off-axis interrogations will be largely 
dependent on the actual shielding material). As a general rule, high-Z shielding 
will allow detection at larger off-axis distances than low-Z materials. 
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1Pulsed Photonuclear Assessment (PPA) 
Technology Enhancement Study 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For several decades, researchers at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Idaho State 
University’s Idaho Accelerator Center (IAC) have applied energetic photon interrogation methods to 
support treaty verification applications related to nuclear weapon configurations. These methods have 
required the development of enhanced radiation detectors1-5 and the design and fabrication of a unique, 
transportable, energy-selectable electron accelerator—the INL Varitron.6 The recent development of the 
Pulsed Photonuclear Assessment (PPA) technique, a collaboration with Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL) and the IAC has continued to support nuclear material detection in various challenging (shielded) 
configurations.7 Currently, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Science and Technology 
Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) have fostered the development of an 
advanced nuclear material detection capability applicable to a wide variety of cargo-container types and 
loading configurations.8-15 While this report’s predecessor8 identified and described the development of 
key detection components of the proposed 10-MeV PPA prototype inspection system, this follow-up 
report focuses on two specific recommendations made in the CY05 report15, namely: (1) enhancement of 
the gamma detection system, (2) assessment of the off-axis detection sensitivity. Figure 1 is a schematic 
of the current prototype PPA inspection system for shielded nuclear material detection. 
Figure 1. Schematic of the PPA prototype nuclear material detection/inspection system. 
2The first recommendation focused on an investigation into a possible enhancement of the original 
PPA gamma-ray detection system in order to utilize photon signatures to detect nuclear material within 
hydrogenous type shielding. Geiger-Müller (GM) tubes were initially selected for use in the PPA system 
as an inexpensive gamma-ray detection method to complement the optimized neutron-based detection 
system. As indicated in the CY-05 report, simple GM detectors, utilizing preliminary detection 
algorithms, demonstrated that it was feasible to utilize gamma-ray counting as an indicator of nuclear 
material within low-atomic number (Z) shielding. While these simple detectors have indicated their 
viability within the challenging pulsed photonuclear inspection environment, the detection methodology 
required optimization. This optimization process prompted the following assessments:  
1. Performance evaluation of several different types of GM detectors. 
2. Thermal neutron correction algorithms to enhance detection probabilities based on GM response. 
3. Performance evaluation of an INL-modified HPGe detector and fast plastic scintillator. 
The second proposed recommendation addressed the off-beam axis detection capability of the 10-
MeV PPA system. This type of characterization is essential for any field-deployable system to address 
applicability to primary or secondary inspection screening. Determination of interrogation parameters 
such as the number of beams, collimation (fan or cone), beam current, and dose to cargo will depend on 
the extent of off-axis sensitivity. In order to characterize the off-axis detection sensitivity, numeric 
simulations for selected configurations were performed with MCNPX. These numeric studies were 
experimentally benchmarked in order to quantify the extent to which the PPA system can detect nuclear 
material when it is placed in positions which are not directly along the photon-producing, electron beam 
axis.
The most recent version of the nominal 10-MeV transportable, prototype nuclear material detection 
system is shown in Figure 2. It utilizes arrays of custom-built and commercially-available Photonuclear 
Neutron Detectors (PND)1 [patented design using 10-atm., helium-3 (He-3) tubes with unique electronics 
and shielding] and co-located, unshielded GM detectors [patent-pending, LND, Inc. tubes (Model 719) 
with electronics and acquisition software]. Nine pairs of collocated GM and PND detectors are 
horizontally mounted on two transportable detector assemblies. Also shown in Figure 2 is a representative 
inspection application utilizing a one-and-a-half metric-ton cargo (i.e., wood and polyethylene pallet 
loading) configuration positioned under the detector array. Inside the trailer, located behind the detectors 
and the pallets, are the other major components of the prototype PPA system including the pulsed photon 
source and the data acquisition system. User controlled operation is provided from a remote location. 
3Figure 2. Transportable, prototype PPA inspection system. 
This prototype system has been shown to detect nuclear material in a series of seven INL 
Calibration Pallets8 even when these pallets are placed in a “challenging” location within a realistic cargo 
container configuration14. The “challenging” inspection configuration is identified in Figure 3. Note the 
position locations of detectors #3 and #16 (Figure 3; right) are on the prototype accelerator beam center 
line and a 19th PND (not shown) is typically located under the test configuration when deployed. The 
average of four additional polyethylene-shielded PNDs, located with the PND detector assemblies, are 
used to measure background neutrons. The nuclear material is placed in the center of a pallet and the 
pallet is positioned in the center of the cargo container. This inspection scenario represents a “challenge” 
because it provides both a realistic photon source-to-cargo center distance (~2.5 to 3 m) while 
maximizing the nuclear material-to-detector distances for all PND and GM detectors. For this selected 
cargo inspection configuration, the interrogating photon beam travels through the cargo at nearly a 
45-degree angle and the radiation detectors are positioned along the sides of the cargo container (no 
detectors are placed below the container in this inspection configuration). 
Figure 3. Cargo configuration schematic top view (left) and end view (right). The detector location 
numbers are shown in the “end view.”  
42. GAMMA-RAY DETECTION CHARACTERIZATION 
In an effort to investigate the possibility of improving/enhancing the PPA gamma-ray detection 
system, several tests were conducted using a variety of gamma-ray detectors and acquisition schemes. 
These tests included evaluation of several GM detectors, an initial appraisal of a fast plastic scintillator as 
a possible improvement over the PPA-utilized GM detectors, and the assessment of an INL-modified 
High-Purity Germanium detector. An effort was also directed towards overall improvement to the data 
acquisition software for both gamma-ray and neutron detection. This section of the report highlights the 
experimental setups, the results from the data collected during those experiments, and the selected 
improvements implemented for optimal data acquisition.  
Currently, GM tubes are being exploited as a means of gamma-ray detection on the PPA system. In 
the early prototype PPA system, simple counting with the GM detectors was evaluated as a means to 
enhance the sensitivity to nuclear material within low-Z shielding configurations. Gamma-ray detection 
provides a method to compensate for reduced neutron signature with low-Z shielding materials and, 
hence, enhances overall PPA system performance. In the presence of low-Z and highly hydrogenous 
shielding, neutron detection is extremely difficult due to the rapid thermalization and subsequent neutron 
absorption which depletes the neutron population. In such shielding configurations, it is possible, 
however, to utilize cargo-emitted gamma-rays to indicate the presence of nuclear material. The utilization 
of GM detectors to enhance low-Z shielded nuclear material arises from the excess gammas produced 
from the delayed effect from fissioning nuclear materials. These excess photons only exist when 
fissionable materials are present. While the CY05 report presented an initial attempt to deploy gamma-ray 
detection with GM counters, optimizations were needed before complementary implementation with the 
PND system could be undertaken. This optimization first required a thorough characterization of the 
proposed GM tube before a specific model could be recommended. The two primary factors considered in 
the selection of the GM tube to be deployed on the PPA system were: 
1. Operation after the accelerator pulse and dead time. 
2. Efficiency of the GM tube. 
The first concern is mitigated by the fact that in any detected event, a complete ionization of the 
gas near the anode is induced. This is independent of the number of photons which cause an ionization 
event and/or the energy of the incident radiation. In a pulsed photon environment this is extremely 
important since a large number of photons will interact in the tube during and immediately after the 
interrogating photon pulse (i.e. flash). This inherent property of GM tubes makes them ideal candidates 
for use in a pulsed photon environment. In particular, this flash response is independent of the 
interrogating electron beam energy. In most GM tubes, dead times range from approximately 50 to 200  
ȝs and provide count rates on the order of 104 counts per second. These are intrinsic characteristics of GM 
tubes and, to some degree, governed the selection of the tubes that were assessed. The final consideration, 
tube efficiency, was determined through a combination of researching manufacturer specifications as well 
as in-depth experimental assessment. 
2.1 Geiger-Müller Detector Evaluations 
GM tubes have novel operational capabilities within a photon flash environment and operational 
performances were assessed for specific models. 
52.1.1 GM Detectors In The Flash 
Based on manufacturer specifications, which fit the general requirements of the PPA system, four 
GM tubes were selected for evaluation. LND Inc. offered the range of GM tubes with the desired 
specifications and was the sole manufacturer of the GM detectors tested. The models selected were the 
LND 719, 740, 72511, and 72120. To address the GM operation after the photon flash, the LND 719 and 
LND 740 GM tubes were evaluated. Tube responses were initially observed on an oscilloscope and 
acquired after the flash with a multi-channel scalar (MCS). The LND 719 was utilized in the early tests of 
the PPA system. These tubes have a listed 100-microsecond dead time (160 ȝs as measured with an 
oscilloscope) which is dictated by the mobility of positive gas ions and the resistor-capacitor (RC) time 
constant. The LND 740 tube had a 65 ȝs dead time. The RC time constant used was based on the 
manufacturer recommended circuit for each GM tube used. The resulting MCS data for these two 
detectors during a representative inspection are shown below.  
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Figure 4. MCS data collected for GM detector models LND 719 and LND 740 during a photon 
inspection.
As Figure 4 illustrates, although the LND 740 recovered from the flash in 60 ȝs, it didn’t reach its 
full efficiency until about 80 ȝs. This was faster than the LND 719 which recovers at about 150 ȝs. The 
faster recovery of the LND 740 is an effect of the smaller tube design; however, this design also reduces 
the efficiency of the detector. Because of the need for increased counting statistics, efficiency becomes a 
more important factor than recovery at this point of the PPA system development. In the delayed counting 
region-of-interest (ROI) acquisition window, the 719 recorded approximately five times the number of 
photon counts when compared to the 740 performance. 
2.1.2 GM Detector Voltage and Dead Time Performance 
To gain a better understanding of GM counting efficiency as a function of input voltage and to 
verify manufacturer specifications, voltage plateau curves were developed. Details relative to these curves 
are presented in Appendix A. For gamma-ray detection applications, the operational voltages were 900 V 
for the 719, 700 V for the 740, and 500 V for both the 72511 and 72120 detectors. Each curve includes 
the dead time corresponding to its temporal response regardless of its passive or active interrogation 
operation.
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Figure 5. Voltage plateau curves and dead time responses for selected LND Gamma-Ray detectors. 
Based on the experience with the LND 719 and 740 detectors, it became apparent that dead time 
performance alone was not a sufficient metric on which to base the GM tube selection. The second 
consideration listed above (efficiency) became the primary criteria for detector selection.  
Detection efficiency is approximately linear with respect to detector surface area. Given this 
relationship, it seems that one would simply choose the largest possible detector to increase efficiency. 
However, response times of the GM tubes are directly proportional to the total effective detection volume. 
As detector volume is increased, the recovery time decreases. Although the LND 740 could recover 35  
ȝs faster than the 719 (see Figure 5), count rates using the 740 were decreased by a factor of eight. Figure 
5 also shows that while the 740 and 72120 tubes recover more quickly that the 719 and 72120, the loss of 
effective detector area and hence, the loss of effective count rates, leads to the conclusion that the 719 
tube is a more appropriate choice for PPA applications at this stage of system development.  
72.2 Neutron and Gamma Detector Normalization Factors 
A critical component in the optimization of the detection algorithm used for the PPA system data 
acquisition scheme was found to be the normalization of both the gamma-ray and neutron signals. 
Normalization of individual detector responses was necessary due to variations in detector-to-detector 
count rates in the pulsed interrogation environment. The variations in non-normalized individual detector 
counts were leading to higher than expected false alarm rates. This was due to higher count rates created 
by individual and summed PND and GM detectors. Variations in identical radiation detectors were 
attributed to several factors including: individual detector electronics, detector physical location, and 
slight variations in tube efficiencies. Normalization of all system detectors improved coefficient 
variations by 385% in the PNDs and 540% in the GMs. By normalizing the PPA detection system, the 
false alarm rates were significantly reduced for interrogations without nuclear material and significant 
improvements were noted in the detection of nuclear material in low-Z shielding configurations.  
2.2.1 Neutron Detector Normalization 
The Varitron linear accelerator was operated at a nominal 10-MeV with a 125-Hz repetition rate. A 
total of ten inspection data sets were collected. Each corresponded to a 10-minute inspection time and all 
data were collected in the delayed region-of-interest window (1.92 to 8 milliseconds) after each 
interrogation pulse. The Polyethylene Calibration pallet was used as a shield material enclosing a 4.8-kg 
depleted uranium (DU) target. Counts from all 19 PNDs, plus the four background detectors, were 
recorded. The top schematic of Figure 6 illustrates the raw counts from these ten acquisitions. Over the 
course of the ten runs, each detector showed a consistent deviation from the mean counts. The average 
coefficient of variation of the raw counts was 22.12%. A correction factor for each detector was 
calculated based on the average deviation from the mean counts. After applying the correction factors, the 
average coefficient of variation was 5.74%. This resulted in a 385% reduction of the coefficient of 
variation and is shown in Figure 6 (center). The applied correction factors, which are based on the 
coefficients of variation, are plotted in Figure 6 (bottom). 
8Figure 6. Multiple investigations of raw PND data (top), normalized PND data (center), and PND 
normalization factors (bottom).  
2.2.2 Gamma-Ray Detector Normalization 
The same procedure used to normalize the PND neutron detectors was applied to the GM detectors. 
The accelerator was operated at the same frequency and nominal energy and data were acquired in the 
same delayed time region. Counts from GM detectors #5-18 were recorded. Detectors #1-4 were under 
development at the time of data collection; however, subsequent characterizations on these detectors have 
been completed. Figure 7 (top) displays the raw counts from the ten repeated interrogations. As in the 
PND normalization, each detector displayed a consistent deviation from the mean counts. The average 
coefficient of variation of the raw counts proved to be 9.68%. A correction factor for each detector was 
calculated based on the average deviation from the mean counts. After applying the correction factors to 
individual detectors, the average coefficient of variation was reduced to 1.78%. Application of the 
correction factors resulted in a 540% reduction of the coefficient of variation. This is shown in Figure 7 
(center). The applied correction factors, which are based on the coefficients of variation, are plotted in 
Figure 7 (bottom). 
9Figure 7. Raw GM data (top), normalized GM data (center), and GM normalization factors (bottom).  
2.2.3 GM Detection Figure-of-Merit Algorithm 
When material is interrogated with photons of sufficient energy, prompt neutrons and gamma-rays 
are emitted. These prompt neutrons quickly thermalize within a few milliseconds after each interrogating 
pulse. This thermal neutron environment generates copious additional gamma-rays primarily through 
neutron capture [(n,J)]and inelastic scattering [(J,J’)] reactions leading to a gamma-ray background that 
could easily mask any induced gamma emissions from a concealed nuclear material. An improved 
signature method is proposed that attempts to compensate for this actively induced, gamma-ray 
background. This method utilizes the response of a bare He-3 detector, co-located with the PPA detector 
arrays, to monitor the thermal neutron environment (nth), and integrates the time-dependent gamma-ray 
response GM detector (J). This signature method (see Equation 1) develops a time (t)-dependent Figure-
of-Merit (FOM) that is mathematically evaluated after each accelerator pulse (tp = time after each pulse 
corresponding to the start of a selected delayed ROI) and compares it to a predetermined, detection-based, 
time-dependent signature.
10
Equation 1. Merit calculation for gamma-based detection algorithm. 
This method relies on the fact that gross, time-dependent, thermal neutron capture response, 
measured by a GM tube per induced thermal neutrons during a pulse inspection, is relatively insensitive 
to changing cargo loadings. Any additional delayed gamma-ray contribution from a nuclear material, such 
as prompt gammas from thermal neutron fissions, or gamma-rays from the decay of delayed neutron 
precursors, will increase the value time-dependent of the FOM. Further improvements in the FOM can be 
derived by optimizing the gamma-ray ROI. 
2.2.4 Gamma-Ray Signatures versus Selected Regions-of-Interest 
The time-dependent evolution of gamma-ray counts in the delayed counting region depends 
strongly on the average Z of the surrounding material and whether there is nuclear material present. If 
nuclear material is present, the ratio of gamma counts to thermal neutrons (as measured by the bare 
neutron detector) will deviate from a time-dependent response associated solely with thermalization and 
capture of neutrons in the inspected object without a nuclear material. 
In order to investigate the variation in gamma-ray detection efficiency as a function of the delayed 
time window, the wood pallet was placed in the beam and data were acquired with and without DU. Three 
different acquisition windows were used: A) 1.92 milliseconds (ms)–8 ms, B) 4 ms–8 ms, and C) 6 ms–
8 ms. Gamma counts were summed over the three windows and divided by the thermal neutron counts 
over the same window as indicated by Equation 1. The FOM ratio of the quantity for J/nth with DU to J/nth 
without DU is given below for each time window based on 120-second inspections: 
Window A (1.92-8 ms): 1.257 r  0.058  
Window B (4-8 ms): 1.385 r  0.097 
Window C (6-8 ms): 1.389 r  0.160 
As the time window is moved further out into the delayed region, the delayed gamma signature 
with nuclear material present is accentuated. Unfortunately, this puts interrogation limits on the pulsing 
rate of the photon source, and at longer delayed times, the number of counts decreases resulting in 
increased measurement uncertainties.  
2.3 Gamma Spectra Utilizing High-Purity Germanium Detectors 
A spectroscopic, gamma-ray detection technology, provided by an INL-modified, High-Purity 
Germanium (HPGe) detection system, was assessed as a possible complement to the PPA system. The 
HPGe detector offered the ability to detect short-lived fission fragments generated through photofission. 
Using a nominal 125-Hz, 10-MeV inspection operation, the HPGe acquired data between accelerator 
³ ³ J(tp) dtp
0
t
tp
tp
1/Hz 
³ nth(tp) dtp
1/Hz 
dtFOM(t) =
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pulses. Although the HPGe detector offers the ability to recover a few  microseconds after the pulse, a 
delay gate was used to acquire data in a 4 to 8 ms time window (corresponding to the last half of the 
available time between pulses).  
Data was acquired from several experiments with a lead-shielded, HPGe detector placed in a 
vertical plane located one meter away from the photon source (Varitron converter) and 70 cm below the 
beamline. A 1.2-kg DU plate was placed one meter from the photon source and on the beam axis. With no 
photon interrogation, Figure 8 presents the spectra with and without the DU material. The background 
was enhanced to include a 60Co calibration response. The 243mPa peak from DU at 1.001 MeV was easily 
distinguishable. Figure 9 shows the corresponding spectra using a nominal 10-MeV, 125-Hz operation. A 
major short-lived peak from 94Sr (5.1-s half-life) and 96Ag (75.2-s half-life) at 1.42 MeV is apparent. This 
combined peak shows a count rate of 1.79 counts per second (cps). When comparing to the DU spectra, 
an additional 220,400 counts in the 300 second acquisition time, or 734 cps (for energies between 0.5 to 
5.2 MeV) are present when DU is included. 
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Figure 9. Gamma-ray spectra for a 10-MeV, 125-Hz Linac operation with and without DU. 
The HPGe detector offers an excellent tool for system diagnostics. As expected, when nuclear 
material is present, the HPGe provides identifiable nuclear material-based delayed counts that the GM 
tube detects. This series of assessments proved that the HPGe detector can not only be used to detect the 
DU, it also offers energy-dependent data to aid in system development. However, the cost associated with 
a wholesale substitution of the PPA system’s GM detectors with HPGe detectors would be prohibitive; 
and hence, has not been recommended. 
2.4 Fast Plastic Scintillator Response 
As another possible alternative to gas-filled GM tubes, fast plastic scintillators were investigated as 
a gamma-ray detection method within the PPA system. The most common organic scintillator is based on 
a matrix of polyvinyl toluene (PVT). It is dissolved in a solvent and subsequently polymerized forming 
the equivalent of a solid solution. These scintillators are relatively inexpensive, can be shaped to any form 
necessary, and provide good sensitivity for 0.1-MeV to 5 MeV photons. The primary advantages of using 
plastic scintillators are their fast response time (~2.5 ns), photon sensitivity (100-500 times better than 
GM), and their ability to use energy information to discriminate spurious signals due to background. The 
associated electronics with scintillators are also quite simple since the light output and electron 
conversion are about three orders-of-magnitude greater than the signal from a GM tube. 
2.4.1 Fast Plastic Experimental Configuration 
To investigate these advantages, a simple test was conducted using a BC-408 (EJ-200) scintillator 
(6-cm diameter, 6-cm length) coupled to a Photonis photomultiplier tube biased at -1280 V. The detector 
was surrounded by one standard 2.54-cm thick lead brick thickness to reduce background and to collimate 
the field of view directly toward the center of the Polyethylene Calibration pallet. Because of spatial 
restrictions, the detector assembly was positioned orthogonally to the accelerator beamline at a distance of 
122 cm from the center of the pallet, which replicates the spacing to GM detectors #3 and #16 (refer to 
13
Figure 3). Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the experimental setup. Two specific responses were investigated 
using the scintillator: (1) recovery after the flash (2) delayed photon counting. 
Figure 10. Plan-view illustration of experimental setup. Note that the lead shield completely surrounds the 
entire detector with the exception of the front and rear faces. 
Figure 11. Photographs of experimental setup illustrating relative positions of the polyethylene pallet and 
shielded detector assembly (left side view is from Polyethylene Calibration Pallet).  
To ensure the scintillator was responding only to photons, energy discrimination was required. This 
was accomplished by calibrating photon energy response with a 60Co source. The pulse-height signal 
corresponding to the Compton-edge (~1 MeV) was measured with an oscilloscope. Using this pulse 
height as a reference, signals from the detector/PMT were passed through a 40-MHz, constant fraction 
discriminator (CFD) which was set with the lower level discriminator at 0.5 MeV. It is important to 
realize that the signal output from photons in BC-408 is nearly 2.5 times that of an equivalent energy 
neutron. Therefore, by setting the discriminator at 0.5 MeV (electron energy equivalent), neutrons below 
1.25 MeV were discriminated. This is useful in looking at signals a few milliseconds after the photon 
flash. In this time regime, nearly all fast neutrons have thermalized and are well below 1.25 MeV.  
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Scintillator
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Lead
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2.4.2 Recovery after the flash 
To assess response after the flash, the MCS was modified so that the dwell time on each acquisition 
channel was reduced to 100 ns. Counting response from the GM (LND 719) detectors and scintillator was 
investigated. As expected, the scintillator was capable of counting immediately after the flash. As 
illustrated in Figure 12, the scintillator was able to count within the first 100 ns after the flash. It should 
be noted that the GM detectors did not begin counting until a significant time after the flash. While the 
GM response was sufficient in the delayed time region (>2 ms), the fast response of the scintillator opens 
the possibility of pushing the counting region closer to the flash and perhaps even into the prompt regime 
during the flash. 
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Figure 12. Time response of scintillator and GM detectors immediately after the flash. 
2.4.3 Nuclear Material Detection 
With the lower level photon discriminator set to 0.5 MeV, tests were conducted using the setup 
shown in Figure 11. Several 10-MeV inspections were conducted with and without depleted uranium 
present in the Polyethylene Calibration Pallet. Using the FOM equation, photon counts were summed 
over varying time intervals and divided by the bare detector (thermal neutron) counts over the same 
interval. Figure 13 shows the results of the FOMs with and without DU for GM #3, GM #16, and the 
scintillator. The respective GM detectors were chosen because of their location on the detector assembly. 
Along with the scintillator, these detectors were located at the centerline height of the DU in the pallet.
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Figure 13. Ratio of the FOM for the polyethylene pallet (DU/no DU) 
It is apparent from Figure 13 that the GM detectors actually perform better in the delayed region-
of- interest. However, at the earliest times (<300 ȝs), or 20 channels, the scintillator performs sufficiently 
well to detect DU. At latter times (within the delayed acquisition region), the scintillator performance 
could be enhanced by further lowering the lower level discriminator to approximately 0.1 MeV. At this 
level, the neutron discrimination would still be effective, while the sensitivity to the low energy photons 
would be enhanced. 
Based on the results of the experiments, it was determined that the additional benefit from the 
speed and sensitivity of the scintillator did not warrant a wholesale substitution in the PPA system at this 
time. The recovery time of the scintillator is certainly fast enough to move the count window closer to the 
flash. In fact, scintillators will likely be the primary detector utilized in a follow-on investigation into 
prompt emission studies. It is possible, however, that larger scintillators that retain their ability to recover 
after the photon flash may prove in the future to be a viable alternative to the GM detectors. From an 
economic standpoint, however, it remains to be seen if scintillators of sufficient size and speed can match 
the low cost advantage of the GM tube.  
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3. OFF-AXIS SENSITIVITY CHARACTERIZATION 
The purpose of this study was to determine the off-axis detection sensitivity of the PPA system 
during the scanning of a cargo container. For the deployment of any PPA system, it is critical to know 
how the detection sensitivity varies in relation to the off-axis location of nuclear material.  
3.1 Numerical Simulations and Experimental Benchmarks 
A computer model was first developed to simulate the experimental setup by calculating both 
photon dose rates (R/min) and total induced fissions in a 1.2-kg DU billet. The two off-axis experiments 
described below were designed to provide a benchmark for the MCNPX code16 predictions and to provide 
a valuable and unique opportunity to further utilize and validate the MCNPX code.  
3.1.1 Experimental Setup for Benchmark Testing 
The experimental setup consisted of the following parameters. A ~30-degree (full angle), tungsten 
collimator was mounted on the beam output and the Varitron was operated at 40 Hz with a nominal 10-
MeV energy. The 1-μA average beam current was monitored using a Faraday cup throughout the study. 
Measurements were made at 2.5 m and 4.9 m from the photon source. A multi-detector test assessment 
configuration was assembled (shown in Figure 14) that included a vertically-positioned PND (with its 3He
tube centered on beam axis), a 1.2-kg DU billet measuring 2.54 cm in diameter and 13.97 cm in length 
positioned directly in the center of the PND’s 3He tube, and a GM tube (LND 719) centered on beam axis 
between an ion chamber (dose monitor) and the PND. The experiment is illustrated in Figures 14 and 15. 
The detector/DU configuration was translated in 30.48-cm increments perpendicular to the center line of 
the beam for each test at 2.5 and 4.9-m standoff distances. 
Figure 14. Illustration of beam off-axis experiment geometry.  
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Figure 15. Plan view off-axis experiment geometry.  
3.1.2 Benchmarking 
MCNPX numerical models simulated the accelerator system by means of a normally incident, 
mono-energetic surface current source of 10-MeV electrons starting on the surface of the electron/photon 
converter. The converter was the INL Varitron electron-to-photon converter. The electrons were assumed 
to start uniformly on the converter surface and inside a 0.5-cm diameter circle centered about the beam 
centerline. The tungsten collimator was initially modeled with a 40-degree full-angle cone aperture. Later 
measurements showed that the full-angle is actually ~30-degrees, but this difference should not affect the 
calculations relative to the subtended angles for the off-axis measurement data. 
The 1.2-kg DU billet was modeled. This cylinder was located at 2.5 m and 4.9 m along the 
beamline axis from the converter and systematically moved perpendicularly off-axis to match the 
experimental measurement locations. The beamline axis, aligned with the center of the converter and DU 
billet, was measured and modeled to be 135.5 cm above the floor. Photon dose rates (R/min) were 
calculated in front of the DU cylinder at each off-axis measurement location. Figures 16 and 17 compare 
the calculated photon dose rates to the measured photon dose rates. Data showed acceptable agreement 
and demonstrated the validity of the MCNPX computer code and models; however, further investigation 
is needed to fully understand the observed differences in the total photon responses. 
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Figure 16. Photon dose rate as a function of off-axis distance for the DU billet at 2.5-m.  
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Figure 17. Photon dose rate as a function of off-axis distance for the DU billet at 4.9-m.  
In addition, DU delayed neutron counts were measured concurrently with the off-axis photon dose 
rates. The measured off-axis delayed neutron counts at the two selected beamline positions (i.e., 
maximum yields) were normalized to the on-axis data. The numerical simulations, predicting the 
corresponding PND delayed neutron counting responses for each off-axis position, were similarly 
normalized. These normalized data are shown in Figures 18 and 19. Comparison of the measured and 
calculated data showed excellent agreement. This demonstrates the validity of the MCNPX computer 
code to predict high energy photon production and photonuclear interactions.  
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Figure 18. Normalized delayed neutron counts versus perpendicular off-axis distance of the DU billet at a 
2.5-meter photon converter-to-DU distance. 
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Figure 19. Normalized delayed neutron counts versus perpendicular off-axis distance of the DU billet at a 
4.9-meter photon converter-to-DU distance.  
Although it will be dependent on the actual shielding material, Figure 20 indicates that a maximum 
off-axis distance of  27 to 31 cm (wood) and  32 to 38 cm (iron) required for detection of 4.8 kg of DU 
concealed in a pallet configuration. This trend is consistent with the shielding properties of low- and high-
Z materials. Highly hydrogenous shielding materials can be expected to limit the off-axis sensitivity to 
30 cm while higher atomic number shielding should allow nuclear material detection at larger off-axis 
distances.
20
Figure 20. Convolution of experimental pallet data with off-axis MCNPX simulations. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A prototype inspection system for nuclear material detection has been developed and characterized 
by INL. The major radiation detection components of the prototype PPA system were built in CY04 and 
integrated into an inspection system in CY05. Subsequent experiments and characterizations of the PPA 
detection system have resulted in additional recommendations to further enhance the technology.  
With respect to the gamma-ray detection system, different GM detectors, a fast plastic scintillator, 
and a High Purity Germanium detector (HPGe) were assessed in a pulsed photon inspection environment. 
The GM (LND 719) detector was shown to have the best overall performance in the pulsed photon 
environment. Beyond the technical performance of this detector, its low cost and availability make it a 
logical choice for a field deployable system.  
Nuclear material detection was further enhanced by data normalization procedures applied to both 
the PND and GM detectors. Normalization of all system detectors improved coefficient variations by 
385% in the PNDs and 540% in the GMs. False alarms have been significantly reduced and 
improvements were noted in the detection of nuclear material in low-Z shielding configurations. Variation 
in the counting window within the delayed acquisition region illustrated that the gamma-ray detection 
signature could be enhanced by looking at a time from 4-8 ms (corresponding to a 125-Hz Linac 
repetition rate) rather than the normal 2 to 8 ms window. 
It is recommended that the PPA technology utilizing a GM counting system based on the LND 719 
detector be the basis for any future demonstrations. However, a comparably cost-effective gamma-ray 
detection system that has a better sensitivity and response time than the LND 719 detector may also be 
suited for this application.  
In terms of off-axis detection sensitivity, simulation and benchmarking experiments have indicated 
that the PPA system can successfully detect nuclear material in typical cargo container inspection 
configurations even when the material is concealed at a distance of approximately 30 cm from the beam 
centerline. It is important to note that the exact detection sensitivity to off-axis interrogations will be 
dependent on the shielding material. High-Z shielding will allow detection at larger off-axis distances 
than low-Z materials.
Future demonstrations of this prototype PPA technology will provide the basis for the design of an 
operational inspection system matched to specified inspection requirements (i.e. CONOPS). 
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Appendix A 
Geiger-Müller (GM) Experimental Descriptions 
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Appendix A 
Geiger-Müller Experimental Descriptions 
The GM tubes were each mounted in an INL provided electronics enclosure that contained the 
pulse shaping amplifier/buffer and programmable high voltage power supply. The proper signal coupling 
circuit was used for each detector, as specified by LND Incorporated’s Nuclear Radiation Detectors home 
page located at http://www.lndinc.com/home.htm. GM tube specifications can also be accessed at that 
link. The 60Co source was located approximately 5 cm from the GM tube, and at the center of the tube 
active area. Preamplifier/buffer and high voltage module low voltage DC power was provided by an Ortec 
M4003 NIM module and a Canberra M1000 portable NIM power supply. The buffer provides a TTL 
level, for each detector pulse, to the Canberra timer/counter input, and count time was set for 180 
seconds. The high voltage, as measured at the GM tube anode, was set below the specified minimum for 
each GM tube, and the voltage for zero counts was established. The high voltage was incrementally 
increased by 25 or 50 volts depending on the GM model (see plateau plots). At each voltage setting, a 
180-second count was completed. The high voltage was measured using a Tektronix TX3 multimeter and 
Fluke 80K-6 high voltage probe. 
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Appendix B 
Neutron Detector Normalization
The PND correction factors previously calculated in ten-minute runs were applied to the 
acquisition system. One-minute acquisition data were collected using the latest version of the National 
Instruments Labview graphical user interface (GUI) to test the correction factors. The accelerator was 
operated at 10 MeV with the Polyethylene Calibration Pallet in the photon beam, center position. 
Windowing was the same as the calibration data set. The coefficient of variation was larger overall which 
can be attributed to counting statistics due to reduced acquisition times (1 minute) and therefore the total 
neutrons counted were decreased. Applying the correction factors resulted in a 160% reduction of the 
coefficient of variation (See Figure B-1). It should be noted that the test data utilized was collected at an 
earlier date and the correction factor was applied in post processing. This implies that all stored data 
(before normalization was implemented) may be normalized using a standard correction factor.
Figure B-1. PND test data (top) with calculated correction counts (bottom). 
In addition, four ten-minute runs were acquired with the accelerator OFF. Figure B-2  illustrates a 
comparison of the PND detector counts with and without an accelerator operating. The average count rate 
was lower with the accelerator OFF (0.301 counts/sec vs. 0.485 counts/sec) but, more interestingly, the 
detector trends are quite different indicating that the detectors are influenced by the operation of the 
accelerator.  
31
Figure B-2. Accelerator effects on corrected PND responses with accelerator ON (top) and OFF (bottom). 
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Appendix C 
Gamma-Ray Detector Normalization
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Appendix C 
Gamma-Ray Detector Normalization 
The gamma correction factors previously calculated in ten minute runs were applied to the 
acquisition system. Data was collected to test the correction factors. It was not possible to correct 
detectors #1, #2, #3, and # 4 because they were not available when the correction factors were calculated. 
Also note that detector #3 and #18 were not available in the test runs. Applying the correction factors 
resulted in a 400% reduction of the coefficient of variation. Although the coefficient of variation is larger 
overall because the test data was collected over one-minute runs, the correction factors were still adequate 
for normalizing the detector responses as can be seen in Figure C-1 (center). It should be noted that the 
test data used were collected at an earlier date and the correction factor was applied in post processing. 
The accelerator was operated at 10 MeV with the Polyethylene Calibration Pallet in the photon beam, 
center position. Windowing was the same as the calibration data set. The spatial ordering of the detectors 
is the same order as the plot. Note the concave shape of the detector responses in Figure C-1 (top). This is 
similar to what would be expected of an isotropic point gamma-ray source that is not equidistant to all 
detectors. If this is the case, it indicates that the variations are not only dependent on detector-to-detector 
variations (like the neutron detectors) but also on position. Figure C-1 (bottom) shows the raw gamma 
counts with the accelerator turned OFF. This data set supports the position-dependence theory since the 
concave form in Figure C-1(top) is not present. 
Figure C-1. GM detector raw data with accelerator ON (top), calculated correction factors (center), and 
raw data with accelerator  OFF (bottom).  
Accelerator Off 
Accelerator On 
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Appendix D 
Testing Detector Normalizations with DU 
The gamma correction factors previously calculated in ten-minute runs were applied to the 
acquisition system. Acquisition data was collected to test the correction factors. As noted earlier, it was 
not possible to correct detectors #1,#2,#3, and #4 because they were not available at the time of data 
collection, however, these detectors have been corrected since that time. The accelerator was operated at 
10 MeV with the Polyethylene Calibration Pallet in the photon beam, center container position. 
Windowing was the same as the calibration data set. Runs were ten minutes long. Figure D-1 displays the 
raw and corrected gamma counts. The three heavy lines represent runs where 4.8kg of DU was present in 
the center of the Polyethylene Calibration Pallet. The heavy pink line is without the polyethylene plug 
[used to provide access to the center of each calibration pallet] in the pallet. Notice in Figure D-1(top) the 
runs without DU are relatively flat compared to the runs with DU. Figure D-2 (top and bottom) show the 
raw & corrected PND counts. The data corresponds to the GM data. Notice when the shielding plug was 
out of the pallet, the DU was easily detected by PNDs #2,#3,#4,#5,and #6 because these PNDs faced the 
plug opening. In all other cases, the DU was not detectable.
Figure D-1. Raw data (top) for GM detectors with and without DU and calculated correction factors 
(bottom) applied with and without DU. 
Figure D-2. Raw data (top) for PND detectors with and without DU and calculated correction factors 
(bottom) applied with and without DU. 
